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INTRODUCTION

Juvenile justice reforms over the last decade have created an enormous
potential for transferring juveniles to criminal court.1 This potential became
glaringly apparent between 1992 and 1995 when forty-one states adopted new
laws or expanded existing ones that expedited the prosecution of juveniles in
criminal courts.2 The pervasiveness of these reforms and the potential
* Henry George White, Executive Director, The Florida Juvenile Justice Accountability
Board; Charles E. Frazier, Professor of Sociology and Affiliate in the Center for Studies in
Criminology and Law, University of Florida; Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Professor of Sociology and
Criminology, University of Florida; Donna M. Bishop, Associate Professor of Criminal Justice
and Legal Studies, University of Central Florida.
Some of the research for this article was part of a project funded under Grant No. 95JN-FX-0030 from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions in this document are those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
1. See Donna M. Bishop et al., Juvenile Justice Under Attack: An Analysis of the Causes
and Impact of Recent Reforms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 138 (1998). The reform
agenda are multifaceted, and their rationales are complicated. See id.
2. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 3 (1996). This has been done by
either lowering the age of juvenile court jurisdiction or by increasing the number of offenses
or offender types that are excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction. See id. at 4. Torbet and
her colleagues report that between 1992 and 1995, 32 states, which already had legislative
exclusion provisions, modified their statutes either to lower the age of juvenile court juris-
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magnitude of their effect could mark the beginning of the end of a separate
system of justice for juveniles.3
In another article in this issue, Lanza-Kaduce and colleagues present data
indicating that recent changes in Florida's transfer laws have had little impact
on the number of offenders who were transferred.' Florida, however, might
be somewhat unique in that changes in the law of transfer, including
indictments, voluntary waiver, involuntary judicial waiver, and prosecutorial
direct file, have long been a part of efforts to reform Florida's juvenile
justice system. This article is intended to provide a socio-legal history of the
transfer laws in Florida, not only the most recent reforms but also transfer
provisions dating back nearly fifty years. Multiple changes involving a mix
of instrumental, expressive, and systems or institutional factors have occurred
during this time. The goals of our analysis are to explore the underlying
reasons for Florida's transfer reforms in particular and to improve our
understanding of the dynamics of legal reform in general.
The impetus behind juvenile justice reform movements is often attributed
to perceptions of increased juvenile crime, especially serious violent crime
and to disenchantment with a perceived leniency in juvenile justice
treatment.' Policymakers want to "get tough" not only to control juvenile
crime (an instrumental effort) but also to reflect their frustration with what
many of them consider to be the pampering of offenders by the juvenile
justice system (an expressive function). In other words, both instrumental

diction, or increase the number of offenses excluded, or both. See id. Reforms similar to the
ones reflected in this last national trend had occurred earlier in some states. New York and
Florida are two cases in point. In some respects, it can be argued that the broad societal
forces present during this last decade, that is, high crime rates and concerns about the ineffectiveness of rehabilitation in crime control, were similarly present in the late 1970s when these
states reformed their juvenile justice systems.
3. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to the Critics of
Juvenile CourtAbolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 929 (1995); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining
Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court,
69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1991); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile
Court: A Proposalfor the Preservationof Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 25
(1990); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Affirming PersonalResponsibility, 2 Juv.
JUST. UPDATE 4, 4 (1996); Francis Barry McCarthy, Should Juvenile Delinquency Be
Abolished?, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 196, 196 (1977); Stephen Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The
Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 1126 (1977).
4. See Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., Juvenile Transfers in Florida:The Worst of the Worst,
10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 277-312 (1999).
5. For a legal history of New York's youthful offender act over the long term, see SIMON
I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY: VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM (1996).
6. See THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (1992); M.A. Bortner,

TraditionalRhetoric, OrganizationalRealities:Remand of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME
& DELINQ. 53, 54 (1986).
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and expressive rationales seem to support the reform movement.7
In an analysis of the recent reform of New Mexico's Children's Code,
Mays and Gregware argue that the instrumental crime control function does
not explain the legal changes because the state had experienced only "a
relatively minor increase in the number of youthful offenders" in the
preceding years They also argue that the reforms are "more than a simple
reflexive reaction to public get-tough pressure."9 The reforms also constitute
a "systems response" by juvenile court stakeholders in that small changes are
initiated from within the juvenile justice system in order to discourage larger
reforms by others that might threaten their survival as a separate system.' °
"Public perceptions that the juvenile justice system [was] failing threaten[ed]
not only the benevolent, regenerative ideal under which most in the system
operate[d], but also the public resources allocated to support that ideal."'"
The juvenile justice system was protected best, according to Mays and
Gregware, by acquiescing to the "get tough" reform agenda, which, in any
event, would affect only a minimal number of cases (have little instrumental
function) but would placate public and political dissatisfaction (an expressive
12
function).

The New Mexico research has sensitized us to the prospect that "systems
responses" might help us understand legal change.13 More theoretical
discussions of law formation raise the same prospect.
One legal
anthropologist in particular, Bohannan, suggests that law is inherently "out
of phase" with other societal institutions and norms, and this might be an
impetus for further legal change. 14 According to Bohannan, even when law
merely attempts to reinstitutionalize customary practices of other social

7. See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE 11 (1963). Gusfield distinguishes
between law formation that is instrumental because it seeks to change conditions in society
and law formation that is primarily an expression of frustration or sentiment. See id.
8. G. Larry Mays & Peter R. Gregware, The Children'sCode Reform Movement in New
Mexico: The Politicsof Expediency, 18 L. & POL'Y 179, 186 (1996).
9. Mays & Gregware, supra note 8, at 187.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 187-88.
12. See id. M.A. Bortner has previously recognized how transfers to adult court could
be functional for juvenile justice organizations. See Bortner, supra note 6, at 54. Donald
Dickson's analysis of the enactment of marijuana laws also illustrates how organizational
interests can affect legislation. See Donald T. Dickson, Bureaucracy and Morality: An OrganizationalPerspective on a Moral Crusade, 16 Soc. PROBS. 143-56 (1968). We adopt the
"systems response" language of Mays and Gregware because broader institutional concerns,
like treatment philosophy and the role of judges, that cut across organizations, may be as
important as the narrower organizational interests of juvenile justice practitioners. See Mays
& Gregware, supra note 8, at 186.
13. See Mays & Gregware, supra note 8, at 186.
14. Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, in THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
LAW 306, 311 (Donald Black & Maureen Mileski eds., 1973).
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groups, it changes those customary practices, if for no other reason than the
need for law to deal with issues in ways that are justiciable. 5 Thus the law
becomes out of phase with the very customs it addresses.
We will apply and extend Bohannan's reasoning. When legal reforms
attempt to alter and not merely reinstitutionalize the customary practices of
other institutions, like the juvenile justice system, we would expect the
problem of phase, or the lack of congruence between law and other
institutional practices and norms, to be marked. Bohannan probably would
not be surprised to see various ongoing institutional adjustments both during
and after the legal reform. Indeed, we suggest that such "system responses"
might be inevitable in law formation and reform, but we are reluctant to
predict their nature or direction.
II.

LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL HISTORY OF KEY TRANSFER PROVISIONS

The early history of juvenile case processing in Florida provided, in
practice, a sort of blended jurisdiction over juveniles charged with criminal
offenses. The legislative intent of the relationship between the juvenile and
criminal courts can be inferred from a 1911 statute.' 6 The statute provided
that a court having jurisdiction over a child who was less than sixteen years
of age and charged with certain crimes could turn the child over to a
probation officer to be dealt with as a delinquent at any time.' 7 If the child
later proved to be "incorrigible, or incapable of reformation, or dangerous to
the welfare of the community," the child could be sentenced as though the
criminal charge had not been suspended. 18 The thrust of the statute was to
permit transfer of cases from the criminal court to the juvenile court at
disposition; this is now termed "reverse waiver."1 9 The reverse waiver
option was not available to juveniles who were charged with rape, murder,
manslaughter, robbery, arson, burglary, or an attempt to commit any of these
crimes. 20 The emphases on the dispositional rather than the adjudicatory
aspects of the case and on the directional flow of the transferred cases from
criminal court to juvenile court distinguish early practices from more recent
ones. 2' Law and practice relating to juvenile offenders followed this
guideline for four decades.
It was not until 1951 that Florida enacted laws that established a

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See id. at 310-11.
See 1911 Fla. Laws ch. 6216, §§ 9-10.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. § 10.
Compare id. §§ 9-10, with FLA. STAT. §§ 985.226-.227 (1998).
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constitutional juvenile court and specified related procedures.22 The law's
focus had clearly shifted to a separate juvenile court. The original 1951
juvenile justice laws have undergone major revisions in every succeeding
decade.23 Our analysis examines revisions that involved major shifts in
policy or practice relating directly to transfer.
A.

Indictment

The first transfer reform after the 1951 juvenile court enactment2 4 came
in 1955 when a statutory provision relating to the indictment of juveniles was
added. 5 This procedural change required the waiver to criminal court of
any child, regardless of age, who was charged with an offense punishable by
death or life imprisonment and who had been indicted by a grand jury on
that charge.26 The law reverted to its earlier 1911 position that disallowed
putting juveniles charged with certain heinous crimes under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court.27
The 1955 mandatory waiver of indicted juveniles was later amended to
divest the juvenile court of any jurisdiction in such cases. In 1967, the
statute was amended to strip the juvenile court of jurisdiction in any case
where a child of any age was indicted by a grand jury for an offense
punishable by death.28 Therefore, in cases punishable by death, the juvenile
court had no jurisdiction and the child was handled in all respects as an
adult. 29 Two years later, this provision was expanded to include cases
where the juvenile was indicted for an offense punishable by life imprisonment.3"
The 1967 and 1969 provisions for automatic divestiture of juvenile court
jurisdiction in capital and life cases were revisited in 1973. 3' This time the
legislature decided to place juveniles who were charged with an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment in the juvenile court unless an

22. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (1951).
23. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1955); FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6)(c) (1967); FLA. STAT.
§ 39.02(5)(c) (1975); FLA. STAT. § 39.04 (2)(e)4. (1981); FLA. STAT. § 39.052(2)(a) (Supp.
1994); FLA. STAT. § 985.227(1) (1997).
24. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (1951).
25. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1955).

26. See id.
27. CompareFLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1995) (removing jurisdiction from juvenile court for
death penalty crimes), with 1911 Fla. Laws ch. 6216, § 10 (disallowing juvenile court
jurisdiction for specific serious crimes).
28. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6)(c) (1967).

29. See id.
30. See FLA.
31. See FLA.

STAT.
STAT.

§ 39.02(6)(c) (1969).
§ 39.02(5)(c) (1973).
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indictment was returned by the grand jury.3 2 In such cases, an adjudicatory
hearing in juvenile court could not commence until fourteen days after the
accused was taken into custody unless the State Attorney advised the court
in writing that an indictment would not be sought, or unless the grand jury
refused to indict the juvenile.33 If the grand jury failed to act within
fourteen days after the offender was taken into custody, the court could
proceed with the juvenile case. 34 The fourteen-day delay in juvenile court
jurisdiction in capital and life cases was amended to twenty-one days in
1978. 3 ' The statutes relating to indictment have not changed substantially
in the last twenty years.
Other than the relatively focused procedural changes just discussed, the
availability of indictments against juveniles for an offense punishable by
death or life imprisonment has remained mostly constant during this century.
Florida's position seems to be consistent with long-standing transfer
provisions throughout the country; cases involving the most serious offenses,
that is, those punishable by life in prison or death, are generally removed
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.36
B.

Voluntary Waiver

Voluntary waiver provides a way for a juvenile to initiate the transfer to
adult court. In Florida, the first statutory reference to a juvenile's right to
demand waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer to criminal court
appeared in 195 1.37 The law required that the demand be made by the
juvenile prior to the commencement of the hearing in juvenile court. 31 It
was probably inevitable that someone would recognize the lack of
congruence between a philosophy justifying a separate court for less
responsible juveniles and a provision that gives juveniles the right to waive

32. The quick legal change between 1969 and 1973 could evidence what Bohannan would
describe as an adjustment to a phase problem. See Bohannan, supra note 14, at 311. The
1969 provision was out of phase with practice because systems responses to juveniles had to
be made before the formal charges were determined.
33. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1975).
34. See id.
35. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (Supp. 1978). This also might indicate an adjustment
to a phase problem. Fourteen days may not have been sufficient time, in practice, to
determine how to proceed in serious cases.
36. See Mays & Gregware, supra note 8, at 182; see also Barry C. Feld, Legislative
Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL

COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 1999) (forthcoming); David S. Tanenhaus,
The Evolution of Waiver in the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra.
37. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1951).
38. See id.
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themselves into criminal court. The institutional response was an amendment
in 1967'9 to require that the juvenile be joined by at least one parent, or a
guardian, or legal counsel to make the demand ° If these conditions were
met, the juvenile court was required to transfer the juvenile's case - for
processing as an adult.4 '
Voluntary waiver was added to Florida's
constitution in 1968,42 and has remained unchanged for the past thirty
years.43
C. Involuntary Judicial Waiver
The first form of involuntary waiver available in most states, including
Florida, involved judicial waiver. In 1951, when juvenile courts in Florida
were first constitutionally authorized, they were required to transfer for adult
prosecution any juvenile over sixteen years of age who was charged with a
capital offense." Beyond this requirement, juvenile court judges were given
complete discretion to waive juvenile jurisdiction of any other alleged
delinquent over the age of fourteen who was charged with a felony.45 The
law was amended in 1967 so that juvenile court judges could, without a
hearing, automatically waive jurisdiction of juveniles charged with any state
or federal law, or any city ordinance relating to the operation of a motor
vehicle. 46 The automatic waiver placed these juveniles in the court that had
jurisdiction over adults who were similarly charged. 47
The 1994 reforms introduced a presumptive judicial waiver provision for
juveniles who had three prior adjudications or adjudications withheld for
felonies, one or more of which involved violence against a person, or the use
or possession of firearms. 48 Prosecutors were required to file a motion for
waiver unless they gave reasons for not doing so, and judges were required
to grant the waivers unless they stated reasons why such a transfer should not

39. See FLA.

STAT.

§ 39.02(6)(b) (1967).

40. The coincidence between the enactment of this amendment and the developments
reflected in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
might not have been accidental. These cases represented a new awareness of problems
associated with procedural rights for juveniles. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30; Kent, 383
U.S. at 562.
41. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6)(b) (1967).
42. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1968).
43. See FLA. STAT. § 985.226 (1997).
44. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (1951).
45. See id.
46. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(1)(a) (1967).
47. See id. This change in the law of involuntary judicial waiver illustrates how problems
of phase may engender legal adjustments. Formal waiver procedures were an inefficient way
to handle juvenile traffic offenders, which was an inevitable consequence of the American
automobile culture. The law was out of phase with the times.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(2)(c) (Supp. 1994).
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take place.49 Presumptive judicial waiver could have increased the number
of transfer cases in Florida by almost fifty percent. 0 In practice, however,
the impact was negligible,5' which illustrates that the presumptive waiver
provision was expressive in effect and perhaps even in purpose.
1. Waiver Hearing
For many years no statutory guidelines for waiver decisions existed.
Instead, transfer decisions were left exclusively to the discretion of juvenile
court judges. These provisions remained unchanged until 1967 when, in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Kent v. United States,52 the
Florida legislature amended them, requiring a hearing in juvenile court before
a judicial waiver could occur. 3 Under the revised provisions, the juvenile
court could not waive jurisdiction without a written order finding that it was
in the best interest of the public to do so." If such a finding was based on
social histories or psychological or psychiatric reports, then the juvenile and
his or her parents or guardian and counsel had the right to examine the
reports and to question the parties responsible for preparing them at the
waiver hearing.
Significant statutory changes with regard to waiver hearings were again
enacted in 1973.56 One change required that two questions be addressed by
the court in a waiver hearing: Was there probable cause to believe that the
juvenile committed the offense charged? Were there reasonable prospects for
rehabilitation before the juvenile reached the age of majority?57 The 1973
changes also established, for the first time, that a court had to consider the
following factors in deciding the prospects for rehabilitation: the nature of
the presenting offense; the nature and extent of the juvenile's delinquency

49. See id. § 39.052(2)(a)(e).
50. See Lanza-Kaduce et al., supra note 4, at 278. The number of cases increased from
6800 in 1987 to 10,000 in 1996.
51. See Charles E. Frazier et al., Get-Tough Juvenile Justice Reforms: The Florida
Experience, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC., July 1999, at 167-84 (forthcoming).
52. 383 U.S. 541; see supra note 40 and accompanying text. Much of Florida's ongoing
tinkering with transfer began 30 years ago in the wake of Supreme Court decisions in Gault
and Kent. See supra id. Those decisions imposed formality on customary juvenile practices
that, until then, had been fraught with unbridled discretion and had been steeped in informality
(especially in contrast with other areas of law). See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30; Kent, 383
U.S. at 562. We suspect that the imposition of formality has aggravated problems of phase
that, in turn, have effected legal changes. Bohannan states that "the more highly developed
the legal institutions, the greater the lack of phase." Bohannan, supra note 14, at 311.
53. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (1967).
54. See id. § 39.02(6)(a).
55. See id. This legal change can be seen as an institutional response to bring Florida law
in accord with the Kent decision. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
56. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09 (1973).
57. See id. § 39.09(2)(c).
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record; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response; and
the techniques, facilities, and personnel available to the court for
rehabilitation. 8
Prior to the hearing, a written report addressing these factors had to be
prepared by the youth agency." The individuals responsible for preparing
the report were subject to questioning by the offender's attorney at the
hearing. 6° If the court found no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation
before the juvenile reached the age of majority, the court was also required
to state in a written order its reasons.6 1
The statutory criteria for an involuntary waiver hearing were substantially
revised again in 1975.62 The new criteria were completely in phase with the
Kent criteria. 63 With the exception of two noteworthy changes in 1978, the
statutory provisions governing waiver hearings that were enacted in 197564
are essentially those that are in effect today.65
58. See id. § 39.09(2)(d).
59. See id. § 39.09(2)(e).
60. See id.
61. See id. § 39.09(2)(f).
62. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09 (1975).
63. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67.
64. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c)-(d) (1975).
65. Currently, law regulating conduct of a waiver hearing is found in section 985.226(3)
of the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 985.226(3) (1997). The following specific statutory
criteria must be considered by the court in ruling on a request by a state attorney for an
involuntary waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer of the case to the criminal court
for prosecution as an adult:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community is best served by transferring the child for adult
sanctions.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted.
4. [Whether there is] probable cause [based on] the report, affidavit, or complaint.
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when
the child's associates in the alleged crime are adults or children who are to be tried
as adults.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the child.
7. The record and previous history of the child, including:
a. Previous contacts with the department, the Department of Corrections, the
former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Department of
Children and Family Services, other law enforcement agencies, and courts;
b. Prior periods of probation or community control;
c. Prior adjudications that the child committed a delinquent act or violation
of law, greater weight being given if the child has previously been found by
a court to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law involving an
offense classified as a felony or has twice previously been found to have
committed a delinquent act or violation of law involving an offense classified
as a misdemeanor; and
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The first adjustment made in 1978 instructed the juvenile court to give
greater weight to the prior record of juveniles during waiver hearings.'
Juveniles targeted were either those who previously had committed a felony
or those who previously had committed two delinquent acts and were charged
with a second felony or third delinquent act.67 The second change replaced
the probable cause requirement with the more general standard of considering
the prosecutorial merit of the complaint before the juvenile court judge could
grant the waiver.68
2.

Prosecutorial Inroads

A major turning point in Florida's approach to selecting juveniles for
involuntary transfer and prosecution as adults came in 1973.69 For the first
time, state attorneys were given the authority, which prior to In Re Gault7 °
was held by county or municipal staff working under juvenile court judges,
to seek transfers of juveniles charged with criminal types of offenses.7'
State attorneys also were granted, for the first time, the discretion to file a
motion requesting the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction for juveniles
fourteen years of age or older.72 The category of offenses for which
waivers were available also changed. Prior law had limited a judge's
discretion to cases in which the youth was charged with a felony offense, but
the 1973 changes allowed state attorneys to request a waiver hearing
whenever a juvenile's alleged conduct if committed by an adult also would
be a violation of law as a felony or misdemeanor.7 3 Despite some shifts in

d. Prior commitments to institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the child, if the child is found to have committed the
alleged offense, by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available
to the court.
Id. § 985.226(3)(c).
In each case, a study and written report on the applicable statutory criteria must be
prepared by the Department of Juvenile Justice and submitted to the court, the state attorney,
the child, the child's parents or legal guardian, and the child's counsel prior to a hearing. See
id. § 985.226(3)(d). A hearing on the waiver motion is required, and all parties have a right
to question the persons responsible for the information in the written report. See id. A
decision to involuntarily transfer a youth pursuant to these provisions must be in a written
order that includes findings of fact with respect to the statutory criteria. See id. Such an
order is reviewable on appeal. See id. § 985.226(3)(e).
66. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c)7. (Supp. 1978).
67. See id.
68. See id. § 39.09(2)(c)4.

69. See

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.09(2)(a) (1973).

70. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
71. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(a) (1973).

72. See id.
73. See id.
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direction over the next few years, placing the authority to transfer with
prosecutors would become the mainstay of Florida's reform movement.
Just two years later the waiver provisions were amended as part of a
major piece of legislation that dominated the attention of the legislature
during the 1975 regular session.74 One important difference between the
approach taken by the Senate and the House of Representatives was whether
to mandate that a state attorney file a motion for waiver in cases involving
certain repeat, serious and violent offenses.75 The House version of the
legislation 76 did not include the mandatory state attorney waiver language,
but the bill coming out of the Senate did.77 The differences between the
House and Senate bills had to be reconciled by a conference committee,
which settled for the Senate position on this issue.78
As a result of the 1975 change, state attorneys were required, for the first
time, to file a motion for waiver in all cases in which a juvenile had
previously been adjudicated delinquent for murder, rape, sexual battery,
armed robbery, or aggravated assault and was facing charges for any of those
offenses for a second or subsequent time.79 The impact of this change was
undoubtedly greater than anticipated. Arguably, the impact was the driving
force behind even more significant changes that were on the horizon.
The number of juveniles tried as adults increased from 381 in 1974
(before the mandate) to 865 in 1976 (after the mandate).8' The flood of
new mandatory waiver hearings, combined with the added complexity of
those hearings, had a tremendous impact on the work load of the juvenile
justice system - a work load that most likely was unappreciated by the
legislative committees on Health and Rehabilitative Services through which

74. See 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-48, § 22.
75. Compare Fla. H.B. 1956, 3d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1975), with Fla. Comm. Substitute for
Fla. S.B. 165, 3d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1975).
76. See Fla. H.B. 1956.
77. See Fla. Comm. Substitute for Fla. S.B. 165, supra note 75.
78. See Fla. S.J. 380, 388-89 (May 26, 1975) (discussing Conference Comm. Report on
Committee Substitute for Fla. S.B. 165 and 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-48). The current provisions
of Florida law relating to judicial waivers are not substantially different than they were
following the 1975 changes. See FLA. STAT. § 985.226 (1997). This may be because directfile provisions have made judicial waiver largely irrelevant. Virtually all transfers occurring
in Florida today are accomplished by direct file and grand jury indictment. See Frazier et al.,
supra note 51, at 178.

79. See

FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2) (1975).
REPORT OF THE AD Hoc SUBCOMM. ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH OF THE FLA. H.R.
COMM. ON HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Feb. 8, 1978, at 59 (available at Fla. Dep't
of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 19, carton 371, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter CHILDREN AND
YOUTH REPORT]. The 1975 revisions had also significantly broadened the statutory criteria

80. See

that the court was required to consider in determining whether the child should be transferred.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c) (1975).
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the bills had moved.8 Prosecuting attorneys, who now had to prepare and
conduct waiver hearings in juvenile court and criminal prosecutions in adult
court, and juvenile court judges, whose waiver cases more than doubled, both
felt the work-load crunch. The fact that some of these juveniles had
previously been waived probably made acceptance of the increased work load
even more difficult. This increase in waiver cases was bound to attract the
legislature's attention as prosecutors and judges sought relief from the added
work-load pressures.82 Significantly, the fallout from the 1975 mandate
appears to have set the stage for a legislative initiative to authorize the direct
filing of a bill of information, which has the effect of placing a case in the
criminal court, by the prosecuting attorney as an alternative to involuntary

81. For most of the last three decades, Florida's juvenile justice system was part of the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). HRS was the largest single state
bureaucracy (and one of the largest in the nation) and was responsible for all welfare and
health programs. Juvenile justice constituted only a small part of this large organization. The
department was explicitly a social service agency and was probably dominated by a social
All legislative bills worked through the various committees and
work perspective.
subcommittees dealing with HRS to get to the floor for consideration. When the legislators
on these committees considered transfer legislation, they dealt with HRS personnel who were
probably less familiar with the interplay between law and criminal justice practices - a
circumstance that most likely contributed to problems of phase.
82. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH REPORT, supra note 80; INTERIM STUDY REPORT OF THE
FLA. H.R. COMM. ON HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES AD Hoc SUBCOMM. ON JUv.
JUST., app. A, at 1 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 19, carton 371,

Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter INTERIM STUDY REPORT]. The name of the Ad Hoc Subcomm.
on Juvenile Justice was changed to the Ad Hoc Comm. on Children and Youth while the study
was in progress. See Ad Hoc Comm. on Children and Youth meeting minutes of Nov. 16,
1977 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 19, carton 371, Tallahassee, Fla.).
The broad direct-file powers of prosecutors are interesting in another light. They might
have been part of a general effort to streamline the administration of justice. A number of
other legal reforms were initiated during this period, the effect of which was to reduce the
time and costs of processing as well as opportunities for challenges. For example, shortly
before the establishment of broad direct-file authority in juvenile cases, direct filing of another
sort was introduced in the criminal courts. See FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.120. Adults arrested
and charged by information with noncapital crimes were subject to jailing and other forms of
restraint without any opportunity for a probable cause determination. See id. When this
practice was challenged in the federal courts, the state defended it on the grounds that a
prosecutor's decision to file constituted a probable cause determination. See Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected this argument, but
it also rejected the appellant's contention that a defendant is entitled to an adversarial
preliminary hearing. See id. The Court mandated only a simple ex parte determination of
probable cause for arrest and otherwise approved of Florida's streamlined processing practices.
See id. Unlike the vast majority of states, which provide for independent review of
prosecutorial filing decisions through either preliminary hearings or presentations to a grand
jury, JEROLD H.

ISRAEL ET AL.,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION

486

(American Casebook Ser. 1995), to this day Florida grants neither except in capital cases. In
sum, understanding the reasons for the grant of direct-file authority to prosecutors in juvenile
cases may be part of a larger institutional response - one to increase prosecutorial powers
and to foster more efficient processing in both juvenile and adult courts.
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judicial waiver."
D. DiscretionaryDirect Filing of an Information
The first attempt to ease the work load came during the 1976 legislative
session. A number of bills were introduced that would have either excluded
certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction or mandated, under certain
circumstances, the transfer of juveniles to adult court. 84 Out of this
assortment of ideas, a single piece of legislation emerged. House Bill 1300
attempted to give state attorneys two means by which to transfer juveniles to
adult court while bypassing a waiver hearing. 5 The first option would have
permitted a state attorney to file an information directly in the criminal court
against any juvenile sixteen years of age or older who was alleged to have
committed a capital offense, a crime punishable by life imprisonment, a
felony of the first degree, or a felony of the second degree. 6
The second option would have given a state attorney the option of
seeking a grand jury indictment against a juvenile charged with any
felony.87 In making its decision on whether to return an indictment against
a juvenile, the grand jury was required to consider a report by the social
services agency applying the Kent criteria then contained in statute. 8 The
first option under House Bill 1300 would have allowed a state attorney to
preempt both the grand jury's role in those cases punishable by death or life
imprisonment and the juvenile's right to have the grand jury consider the
case.8 9 The second option would have permitted a state attorney to preempt
the juvenile court judge's opportunity to consider the Kent criteria and the
juvenile's right to have the juvenile court judge examine those criteria. 9°
Under either scenario, the state attorney's role in the process would have
been greatly enhanced while the juvenile court judge's role effectively would
have been eliminated. In an apparent attempt to balance the expanded new
authority given to prosecutors, House Bill 1300 also authorized a criminal
court judge to dismiss an information or indictment and treat the offender as

83. See Frazier et al., supra note 51, at 178. With the availability of the direct-file option,
the use of the waiver procedure declined steadily from 1978 to 1994 and has declined even
more since then with the expansion of the direct-file option to juveniles who were fourteen
or fifteen years of age. Judicial waivers now account for less than one percent of transfers
in Florida. See id.
84. See INTERIM STUDY REPORT, supra note 82, app. A, at 1.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Fla. H.B. 1300, 4th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1976).
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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a juvenile when the judge had determined that the circumstance so justified.9 ' These built-in contradictions might help explain why, on final
passage of House Bill 1300, a substantial number of members dissented in
both chambers of the legislature.92 The bill was vetoed by Governor Reubin
Askew on June 23, 1976. 93 In his veto message the Governor stated as
follows:
House Bill 1300 is essentially an attempt to make it easier for
prosecutors in Florida to try 16 and 17 year olds as adults. It
emerged from a widespread feeling of frustration with the performance of our criminal justice system [by which he meant the
criminal and juvenile justice systems] as it relates to these older
juveniles. Many feel that our present system is inadequate in
confronting the problems posed by juvenile crime. And I agree. But
the answer will not be found 94in efforts to transfer more juveniles to
the adult corrections system.
In this message, the Governor recognized the significance of the new role
outlined for prosecutors and the potential such legislation had for putting still
more juveniles in the adult corrections system. His veto message, however,
reframed the rationales. It focused more on general dissatisfactions with the
system's ability to control juvenile crime (an instrumental concern) than on
the institutional response to work-load problems associated with mandatory
waiver and the reappearance of previously waived juveniles. Governor
Askew emphasized two basic flaws in the bill. First, he believed the
provision that allowed prosecutors to file an information against a juvenile
in a capital case violated the constitutional requirement of a grand jury
indictment in capital cases. 95 Second, the Governor was troubled by the
fact that there was no requirement that state attorneys consider the Kent
criteria or otherwise explain a direct-file decision, as judges were required to
do.96 The Governor was concerned that a criminal court judge was allowed
to dismiss an information or indictment without having to either consider the

91. See id.
92. The Senate vote on final passage was 22 yeas and 16 nays. See Fla. S.J. 505-07 (Reg.
Sess. 1976). The House vote on final passage was 91 yeas and 17 nays. See Fla. H.J. 1075
(Reg. Sess. 1976).
93. See Fla. H.J. 1419 (Reg. Sess. 1976).
94. Veto of Fla. H.B. 1300 (letter from Gov. Reubin Askew to Sec'y of State Bruce
Smathers, June 23, 1976, at 4) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.)
[hereinafter Veto Message]. The Governor's message does not mention the need to find relief
from work load pressure, which seems to have been a motive for the direct-file provisions that
were enacted into law two years later.
95. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1968); Veto Message, supra note 94, at 2.
96. See Veto Message, supra note 94, at 3.
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Kent criteria or provide a written explanation for the decision to dismiss.'
Governor Askew also noted that the Florida House of Representatives
had just adopted legislation directing a comprehensive study of juvenile laws
to be acted on by the legislature during the 1977 session.98 While pledging
his full support for that effort, the Governor admonished the legislature,
stating that this study should be "careful, cautious, and comprehensive" so
as to protect the rights of accused juveniles while protecting society from the
harm caused by juvenile crime. 99 Governor Askew balanced concern about
liberty interests against instrumental statements of crime control, but he
ignored the work-load dynamics that might require an institutional adjustment.
The study of the juvenile justice system that was promised in 1976 was
indeed comprehensive, and it continued throughout and beyond the 1977
legislative session."° The study gathered input in several ways. For
example, the Supreme Court of Florida sponsored a two-day conference on
juvenile laws in December 1976.1°1 Public hearings on the same topic
were held in Miami in January 1977 and in St. Petersburg in February
19 7 7.1°2 Input was also obtained from a survey of more than 1100 juvenile
justice system stakeholders, a review of the juvenile laws in other states, a
statistical analysis of the relationship between delinquency and a number of
social variables, and a special study of the judicial waiver process.1 3
Finally, numerous legislative committee and subcommittee meetings were
held to receive public testimony and comment. The study culminated in a
report issued by the Ad Hoc Committee on Children and Youth on February
8, 1978.'04
The issues addressed at the Supreme Court's conference included
procedures for waiver to adult court. l05 The Ad Hoc Committee's staff
report on the conference indicates discussion of and dissatisfaction with
97. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(d)l.-8. (1975).
98. See Veto Message, supra note 94, at 4.
99. See id.
100. The study was legislatively mandated in the 1976 Regular Session and was ongoing
during the 1977 Regular Session; the first opportunity for the legislature to act on the study
report was the 1978 Regular Session.
101. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH REPORT, supra note 80, at 86.
102. The agenda for these hearings included representatives of the judiciary, prosecuting
attorneys, public defenders, law enforcement, state and local social services agencies, and
school officials, and also afforded an opportunity for comment from the public. See id. at 8182, 84.
103. See id. at 86-93.
104. See id.
105. See AD Hoc SUBCOMM. ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH OF THE FLA. H.R. COMM. ON
HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES STAFF REPORT: ORLANDO CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 19, carton 371, Tallahassee,

Fla.).
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waiver requirements in cases where a juvenile had previously been waived
to adult court. 1' 6 This emphasis focused on the institutional problems
associated with earlier changes in the law. Again, the main complaint was
that waiver hearings were mandated in cases in which juveniles were facing
a second or subsequent charge for a violent crime, even where the prior
charge for a violent offense had resulted in a decision to waive the case to
criminal court. 0 7 Although the outcome of such waiver hearings was
predictable, the prosecutors and judges still had to go through the motions
and the hearings. Thus, one of the recommendations was the enactment of
a "once waived, always waived" statutory provision. °8
The stakeholder survey" covered a number of other key issues,
including the age range for juvenile court jurisdiction and the confidentiality
of juvenile records." 0 But the most relevant issue to our considerations
here concerned the legal mechanisms by which juveniles accused of a
violation of law could be transferred from the juvenile to the criminal
division of the circuit court for prosecution as adults."' More than 63%
(N=410) of the survey respondents favored retaining the then current system
under which juveniles could be transferred to adult court through a grand
jury indictment or a judicial waiver." 2 The committee staff noted that this
showing of preference was made even more significant because nearly 80%
(N=49) of the respondents had given no response to this question." 3
There was no reference to survey findings in favor of retaining the
waiver hearing process in the report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Children
and Youth." 4 The report did note, however, that critics of the waiver
hearing believed that "[i]t was ... cumbersome, time-consuming, and
function[ed] as a 'mini-trial' considering factors which ha[d] often been
previously determined at a detention hearing."''15 It appears there was no

106. See id. at 7.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See INTERIM STUDY REPORT, supra note 82, at 6; CHILDREN AND YOUTH REPORT,
supra note 80, at 87; see also the survey instrument with a cover letter from the chairman
dated Dec. 6, 1976 and an undated staff analysis of the responses received to the juvenile
justice questionnaire consisting of 18 numbered pages and 9 unnumbered attachments
[hereinafter Analysis of Juvenile Justice Questionnaire], available in the working papers of
the AD Hoc SUBCOMM. ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH OF THE FLA. H.R. COMM. ON HEALTH &
REHABILITATIVE SERVICES (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 19, carton
371, Tallahassee, Fla.).
110. Analysis of Juvenile Justice Questionnaire, supra note 109, at 5-6 (questions 10, 12),
16-18 (questions 59-64).
111. See id. at 6-8 (questions 14-20).
112. See id. at 8 (question 20).
113. See id.
114. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH REPORT, supra note 80.
115. Id. at 59.
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consensus to completely eliminate waiver hearings," 6 but there was a good
deal of interest in expediting transfers in some cases." 7 Specifically, the
interest was in expediting the process by which older juveniles, who had
prior delinquency records and who had not responded favorably to juvenile
system interventions, could be transferred for prosecution as adults."'
As the 1978 session approached, the preferred means for expediting the
waiver process became clear. Both the House of Representatives and the
Senate developed a package of juvenile justice reforms that included
provisions granting state attorneys, in certain cases, the authority to file an
information on juveniles directly in the criminal division of the circuit
court. 19 The legislative solution to institutional problems associated with
the work-load pressures and the targeting of specific kinds of offenders
always seems to bring legislators back to placing more authority with state
attorneys. 120

Several groups submitted written recommendations with respect to
procedures for prosecuting juveniles as adults and processing subsequent
cases; some of the suggestions stopped far short of focusing on prosecutors.
The Florida Conference of Circuit Judges, for example, adopted a resolution
recommending statutory changes providing that a juvenile who previously
had been waived for prosecution as an adult should thereafter be treated as
an adult for all alleged violations of the law.' 2' This was a clear and
simple solution to the problem of work-load pressures, and it would not have
shifted any new authority to prosecutors.
The Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Task Force of the Governor's Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended a similarly cautious
response. 22 With respect to draft legislation under consideration by the
Senate, the Governor's Commission recommended the following:
(1) that the minimum age for waiver be sixteen years, because the
juvenile justice system was better equipped to deal effectively with

116. See Analysis of Juvenile Justice Questionnaire, supra note 109, at 8 (question 20)
(over 63% of survey respondents favored retaining the waiver procedure).
117. See id. at 8 (question 21) (nearly 70% of survey respondents favored changing the
waiver procedure for youth who had previously been waived).
118. See id. at 6-8 (questions 14-20).
119. See Fla. S.B. 119, 4th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 7 (1978); Fla. H.B. 1956, 4th Leg., Reg.
Sess., § 2 (1978).
120. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 2, at xv-xvi.
121. See Recommendations Regarding Potential Juvenile Law Legislation Adopted by the
Florida Conference of Circuit Judges (Oct. 11, 1977) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div.
of Archives, ser. 19, carton 371, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter Recommendations].
122. See Statement of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Task Force on Draft
Senate Bill 119, at 4-5 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton 651,

Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter Statement].
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young offenders;
(2) that procedures for indictments should be eliminated so that
judicial waiver would be the only process by which a child could be
transferred to the criminal justice system; and
(3) because of the serious consequences of transferring a child to the
adult system, it should never be imposed without a waiver hearing,
and therefore
the direct filing of an information was strongly
23
opposed.

Despite the clear preference of Florida's Conference of Circuit Judges 124 and the Governor's Commission 25 for retaining juvenile court
jurisdiction and strengthening judicial discretion over waiver, the original
version of the Senate bill included neither of these provisions. 126 Indeed,
the bill provided for the direct filing of an information on a juvenile who was
sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense when in
the judgment of the state attorney, adult sanctions should be considered or
imposed. 27 The original Senate bill was also somewhat contradictory in
tone. On the one hand, it incorporated significant prosecutorial discretion in
the transfer process. 28 On the other hand, it also included ambiguous, if
not internally contradictory, provisions requiring a criminal court judge to
transfer the case back to juvenile court upon a showing by the juvenile that
he:
(1) had not previously been found to have committed a delinquent
act that was classified as a felony and been committed to state
custody; or,
(2) had not twice previously been found to have committed misdemeanors for which he was committed to state custody; and
(3) was under the age of 16 when the offense charged was com29

mitted. 1

A later version of the Senate bill deleted this last requirement, which
appeared to be in conflict with provisions setting age limits on a state
attorney's discretion to direct-file charges against juveniles. 3 ° This version

123. Id.
124. See Recommendations, supra note 121.
125. See Statement, supra note 122.
126. See Fla. S.B. 119, 4th Leg. (1978).
127. See id. § 7.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Compare id. (requiring the circuit judge to transfer the case back to juvenile court
upon a showing by the juvenile that he or she had not been convicted twice of a misdemeanor
and was under the age of 16 when the current offense allegedly was committed), with Fla.
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of the legislation also proposed to repeal the mandate that a state attorney file
a motion for waiver in repeat violent offender cases, that is, those in which
a juvenile, previously adjudicated delinquent for murder, rape, sexual battery,
armed robbery, or aggravated assault, was being charged with one of those
offenses for a second or subsequent time. 31 Instead, prosecutors were
given the option of direct filing an information in such cases.' 32 Without
a doubt, the structure of the juvenile justice system and its traditional
dependence on a strong judicial role was on the brink of a major change.
The Senate legislation was all the more portentous because the 1978
33
Florida House of Representatives was considering a very similar bill.
The House bill contained the same age restrictions but avoided the
constitutional problems of the 1976 House Bill 1300 by excluding cases
involving capital or life felonies. 3 4 It allowed state attorneys to direct file
an information, but their discretion was limited to cases in which the juvenile
had two prior findings of delinquency and one prior commitment for an act
that if committed by an adult would have been a felony. 35 Both 1978 bills
provided that once a juvenile had been transferred for adult prosecution by
any means and had been found to have committed the offense charged (or a
lesser offense), the juvenile was to be treated as an adult for any subsequent
36
violation of law.'
The record indicates that the compromise reached by the conference
committee split the difference between proponents of the traditional juvenile
court philosophy, which centered on judicial discretion and control, and those
favoring prosecutorial authority as a means of reducing work loads. 37 The
Kent criteria 38 and the sentence-back option that passed in the final version

Committee Substitute for S.B. 119, 4th Leg., § 7 (1978) (requiring the circuit judge to transfer
the case back to juvenile court upon a showing by the juvenile that he had not been convicted
twice of a misdemeanor regardless of age when the current offense was committed).
131. See Fla. S.B. 119, § 7.
132. See id.
133. See Fla. H.B. 1956, 1lth Reg. Sess. (1978).
134. See id. § 2.
135. See id.
136. See id.; Fla. S.B. 119, § 3.
137. See 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-414, § 7. Compare Senate Staff Analysis and Economic
Statement on Committee Substitute for S.B. 119, at 4 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div.
of Archives, ser. 18, carton 651, Tallahassee, Fla.), with March 29, 1978 meeting minutes,
FLA. H.R. COMM. ON HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES (available at Fla. Dep't of State,
Div. of Archives, ser. 19, carton 370, Tallahassee, Fla.) and attachment entitled Revision of
ch. 39 - Explanation of Substantive Changes, at 2 [hereinafter ch. 39 - Explanation of
Substantive Changes]. Although these comments were addressed to a House of Representatives proposed committee bill (subsequently Fla. H.B. 1956), they are instructive because
the provisions relating to direct filing of an information were very similar to those that became
law following the 1978 session.
138. See supra notes 40 & 52 and accompanying text.
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appears to be a token concession to the traditionalists.13 9 The institutional
response to address work-load pressures that had started the process seemed
to be giving way to more instrumental concerns relating to combating the
juvenile crime problem in general.' 4°
Direct-file provisions were part of a comprehensive reform of Florida's
juvenile justice system considered in 1978.141 The Senate and House bills
regarding transfer were at odds so a conference committee offered a
compromise position that would be acceptable to both. 142 This compromise
allowed the direct filing of an information on a juvenile who was sixteen or
seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense if, in the judgment
of the state attorney, the public interest required that adult sanctions be
considered or imposed. 143 Under the compromise, a juvenile against whom
a direct information was filed (not the criminal court judge) could challenge
the action of the state attorney in the criminal court and have the case
transferred back to the juvenile court. 44 To do so, however, the juvenile
had to prove a negative; he or she had not previously been found to have
committed two delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified
145
as a felony under Florida law.
With respect to the provisions relating to direct filing of an information
against certain juveniles, the 1978 legislation that became law closely
resembled the bill that had been initially proposed by the House Committee
on Health and Rehabilitative Services that year. 146 An explanation of
proposed changes prepared for the members of that committee sheds light on
the rationale for the direct-file provisions that were enacted in 1978.147 The
explanation echoes the instrumental language of Governor Askew's 1976 veto
139. See 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-414, § 7.
140. The instrumental aspect of this change can be appreciated by looking at the general
increase in juvenile arrests in Florida until the mid-1990s as well as the increases in the
number of transfers in the state until about the same period. See JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY
BOARD, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE FACT BOOK 46, 66 (1996) [hereinafter
1996 ANNUAL REPORT]; JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY BOARD, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE FACT BOOK 51 (1994).

141. See supra notes 98-140 and accompanying text.
142. See FLA. S.J. 764, 765 (June 2, 1978) (statement of the conference committee)
(recommending that the House of Representatives and the Senate compromise on the
provisions relating to direct filing of an information).
143. See FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4. (Supp. 1978); 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-414, § 7.
144. See FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4. (Supp. 1978).
145. See id.
146. Compare Fla. H.B. 1956, § 2 (1998), with 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-414, § 7; see also
supra note 137 and accompanying text. The House staff's explanation of changes proposed
in the House legislation focused on the direct-file provisions. On the other hand, the Senate
Staff Analysis seems to place equal emphasis on the "once waived, always waived" change,
and the new procedures relating to the disposition of juveniles transferred for prosecution as
adults. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
147. See Ch. 39 - Explanation of Substantive Changes, supra note 137, at 2.
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of House Bill 1300 and states that a major concern is the need "to more
efficiently and effectively remove hard core, repeat offenders from the
juvenile justice system."' 4 The staff analysis notes that direct file serves
the crime control goal and concludes that "the underlying assumption is that
such a [juvenile] is unresponsive to rehabilitative efforts, and accordingly
should be considered for placement in the adult correctional system for the
protection of society."' 4 9
A Senate staff analysis and an economic assessment of the new law offer
little additional insight into the complex and shifting rationale for the directfile provisions upon which the legislature finally agreed. However, the
analysis does suggest that in order to win approval for the direct-file
language, as a compromise, the provisions governing sentencing of juveniles
50
who were successfully prosecuted as adults were completely revamped.'
The pertinent point made in the analysis is that all of the waiver criteria
formerly considered by a juvenile court judge would have to be considered
by a criminal court judge at the end of the trial of a juvenile prosecuted as
an adult. 5 ' This change appears to have been designed to preserve a role
for the judge, albeit, the criminal court judge, and a place for the Kent
criteria 152 in sentencing decisions for transferred juveniles.
The direct-file provisions enacted in 1978 15 remained unchanged until
1981 when the right to challenge a state attorney's direct-file decision was
4
limited to cases in which a juvenile was charged with a misdemeanor.15
To reverse a transfer, a juvenile still had to prove a negative: either that he
had not previously been found to have committed two delinquent acts or that
none of his prior delinquencies had involved an offense classified as a
felony. 5 5 In 1990, the legislature shifted the burden for meeting eligibility
for transfer in these cases to the prosecutor.156 This change eliminated the
awkward requirement that a juvenile prove a negative in order to challenge
157
the direct-file decision in misdemeanor cases.
The authority of prosecutors to direct file an information has existed

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Staff Analysis and Economic Statement on Committee Substitute for S.B. 119,
supra note 137, at 4.
151. See id. at 3-4.
152. See supra notes 40 & 52 and accompanying text.
153. See FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(c)4. (Supp. 1978).
154. See FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(c)4. (1981).
155. See id.
156. See FLA. STAT. § 39.047(4)(e)5. (Supp. 1990).
157. See id. These seemingly minor amendments illustrate Bohannan's point that law is
often out of phase in ways that require institutional adjustments to make cases more
justiciable. See Bohannan, supra note 14, at 311.
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since 1978.'58 However, the range of cases over which this authority can
be exercised has expanded, especially because of legislation enacted in
1994."59 The discretion of prosecutors to direct file was extended to
fourteen- and fifteen-year-old adolescents who were charged with any of
fourteen "qualifying" offenses, that is, arson, sexual battery, robbery,
kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated assault, aggravated stalking,
murder, manslaughter, bombing, armed burglary, aggravated battery, lewd
and lascivious acts with a child, and using a firearm in the commission of a
felony."6° Although the 1994 direct-file reform widened the net to allow
many more cases to be transferred, 16 1 it was rarely used. 162 Thus, this
provision seems to have been largely expressive rather than instrumental,
especially in terms of its impact. This view is reinforced by data from
interviews with prosecutors about the 1994 reforms. 163 Even though
prosecutors have not used the lower age provisions, most report an interest
in lowering the minimum age even further."6
E. Mandatory Direct Filing of an Information
The 1978 legislation that first granted direct-file discretion to prosecutors
also included a change in waiver provisions that had the effect of creating a
de facto mandate for direct filing in certain cases. 165 The law required that
a prosecutor file either a waiver motion in juvenile court or an information
in criminal court in any case involving a child fourteen years of age or older
who had previously been charged with murder, sexual battery, armed or
strong-armed robbery, aggravated battery, or aggravated assault and who was
currently charged with a second or subsequent offense of a similar nature."6 Faced with choosing either a mandatory waiver hearing or a
mandatory filing of an information, the choice for prosecutors would have
been obvious in most, if not all, cases. In 1994, mandatory direct file was
expanded. 167 A new provision was added for juveniles who had three prior
adjudications (or adjudications withheld) for felonies arising out of different
offense occasions and for which they had already served three distinct
residential commitments. 168 The 1994 reforms were, in part, a reaction to
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159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(c)4 (Supp. 1978).
See FLA. STAT. § 39.0587 (Supp. 1994).
See
See
See
See

id. § 39.0587(1)(e)a.-n.
Lanza-Kaduce et al., supra note 4, at 279.
Frazier et al., supra note 51, at 172.
id. at 178.

164. See id.
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FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(a) (Supp. 1978).
id.
FLA. STAT. § 39.0587 (Supp. 1994).
id.
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a number of crimes that had been perpetrated by juveniles, and a general
sense that juvenile crime was outof control. 69
In the 1990s, one offense that seemed to attract juveniles and outrage
adults was motor vehicle theft. Many Floridians who were victims of motor
vehicle theft and their insurers, were said to have complained loudly and
often to their legislators. In 1996, the legislature responded by adding a new
category of offense to the mandatory direct-file provisions of law. 7 °
Prosecutors were required to file an information against a juvenile, regardless
of age, who was accused of any criminal wrongful taking of a motor vehicle,
for example, car jacking or grand theft of a motor vehicle, that resulted in
bodily injury or death. 7' If the juvenile seriously injured or killed a
person not involved in the underlying offense, while the juvenile had
possession of a stolen vehicle, transfer was mandatory.'
In all such cases
the driver and all willing participants in the stolen motor vehicle at the time
of the injury or death, that is, anyone who had participated in the car theft,
were subject to mandatory transfer to adult court.'73
This provision is not likely to have any instrumental impact on motor
vehicle thefts by juveniles because it presumes too much. First, the provision
presumes that juveniles perceive the risk of accident to be high. Second, it
presumes that juveniles know the details of the law. Last, it presumes that
either the risk or the law matters to juveniles when they steal a car. Since
the prosecutors already have discretionary authority to direct file against
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, 174 the goals of this provision are more
likely expressive than instrumental. Instrumental crime control goals seem
to have yielded to purely expressive ones once the transfer provisions were
sufficiently broad to allow adult prosecution for all serious cases. Interestingly, however, this happened in Florida at a time when most other states

169. See Frazier et al., supra note 51, at 169. Several of these crimes evinced strong
official reactions that made headlines. See id. This is the only clear example among the
many reforms in Florida's transfer law where the reform followed dramatic press coverage.
Most studies of law formation in juvenile and criminal law note that the press plays a major
role in the process. See SINGER, supra note 5, at 46-74; John Hagan, The Legislation of
Crime and Delinquency: A Review of Theory, Method, and Research, 14 L. & SoC'Y REV.
603, 623-25; Richard C. Hollinger & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Criminalization:
The Case of Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101, 105-07 (1988); Mays & Gregware,
supra note 8, at 186-89. The archives and legislative history sources in Tallahassee
occasionally include press clippings, but usually cover the legislative progress of various bills
rather than dramatic crime stories. We cannot rule out the possibility that individual
legislators reacted to press coverage in the other Florida reforms, but the retained records we
were able to recover do not indicate that they had.
170. See FLA. STAT. § 985.227(2)(c) (1997).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id. § 985.227(1)(b).
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were just beginning to address the juvenile crime problem in an instrumental
way.'75 In short, Florida began getting tough with juvenile offenders
almost inadvertently in the wake of reforms aimed at solving a practical
institutional problem. These get tough reforms became instrumental and
continued later in expressive form well beyond the time when a practical
need existed for them. Throughout Florida's juvenile justice history there
appears to have been a lack of connection between particular reforms and the
targeted problems - they were out of phase.
III.

CONCLUSION

This study examined the evolution of transfer in the state of Florida since
the inception of a separate juvenile court nearly fifty years ago. Other
studies of juvenile law formation have focused on broad issues, like the
emergence of the juvenile system itself,'7 6 or on specific reforms at specific
times, like the 1993 revision of New Mexico's Children's Code. 177 By
focusing on the various legal changes in one area of law over the long term,
we gained a different perspective on the cumulative give-and-take in the
process of law formation. Although we had previously analyzed the
instrumental and expressive dimensions of Florida's 1994 transfer
reforms,'78 we were frankly surprised at how important "systems responses"
were in the long-term evolution of Florida's law of transfer. We often found
that legal changes reflected efforts to adjust to institutional or organizational
problems, or what Bohannan might refer to as problems of phase. 179 This
was true for law formation of the various methods of transfer used in Florida.
Several examples demonstrate this point.
Indictment procedures created problems of phase that had to be
addressed. For example, after legislators removed all juvenile justice
jurisdiction from cases in which indictments were expected, 180 they had to
reinstate it in 1973 to give prosecutors the time necessary to seek indictments. 181 The first time period allowing fourteen days proved to be
inadequate, 8 2 so they adjusted the time to twenty-one days in 1978.183
Voluntary waiver also required institutional adjustments.
Earlier

175. See Charles E. Frazier et al., Juveniles in Criminal Court: Past and CurrentResearch
from Florida, 18 QUINNPIAC L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
176. See ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969). For a review of criminal and
juvenile law formation studies, see Hagan, supra note 169.
177. See Mays & Gregware, supra note 8.
178. See Lanza-Kaduce et al., supra note 4, at 277-312.
179. See Bohannan, supra note 14, at 311.
180. See FLA. STAT. § 39 .02(6)(c) (1967); FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6)(c) (1969).
181. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1973).
182. See id. § 39.02.
183. See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (Supp. 1978).
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provisions that gave juveniles the independent authority to demand waiver
were inconsistent with the larger juvenile justice logic that juveniles had
limited capacity to make mature choices.1 14 In 1967, the legal adjustment
required that the juvenile be joined in the demand by a parent, guardian, or
legal counsel.185
Transfer via involuntary judicial waiver procedures also required
institutional responses to make adjustments when legal efforts were perceived
to be out of phase with practice or societal norms. Judicial waiver hearings
did not comport with America's automobile culture so waiver hearings were
bypassed and waiver became mandatory for juveniles charged with various
traffic offenses beginning in 1967.186 This institutional adjustment insulated the juvenile court from being overwhelmed by numerous traffic cases.
The preceding examples illustrate the role of institutional adjustments in
dealing with problems of phase as a source of legal change and reform. The
socio-legal history of transfer in Florida identified numerous other examples
of this pattern. The most critical change, the institutionalization of
prosecutorial discretion in transfer that eventually led to direct file, 187 itself
to work-load pressures that were created
began as an institutional adjustment
188
by previous legislative tinkering.
In 1973, the Florida legislature mandated judicial waiver hearings for
various repeat violent offenders. 8 9 The waiver hearing work load for
prosecutors and judges more than doubled in the year after the reform.' 9
An institutional adjustment was inevitable, but the original legislative efforts
at adjustment" misfired, in part, because they were not sufficiently
focused on the immediate work-load problem. These legislative efforts
opened areas of conflict and raised constitutional questions. In fact, the
92
initial legislative attempt to adjust was vetoed by Governor Askew.'
However, in the process, he reframed the rationale of the reform effort and
transformed the issue into one of instrumental crime control instead of one
aimed at relieving work-load pressures. 193 Eventually, in 1978, legislators
gave direct-file authority to prosecutors, addressing both the work-load
problem and instrumental crime control issues.' 94 The new law was

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1951).
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effective in minimizing the use of waiver hearings and in transferring more
delinquents to criminal court. By 1992-93, the number of transfer cases in
Florida swelled to an annual rate of over 7200,'9' after which it stabilized
at somewhat lower rates. After 1978, the proportion of transfer cases
handled by judicial waiver196declined steadily to only one percent of all
transfers in any given year.
The instrumental intent and effect of early direct-file provisions on the
processing of juveniles did not translate into a change in crime or delinquency rates. 197 Moreover, the instrumental aspects of the early direct-file
provisions seemed to give way to later reforms that were expressive in effect
and probably in purpose. The 1994 reforms provided the clearest evidence
of this transformation from instrumental to expressive law. 198 This legislation passed in an environment in which transfer rates, which had been high,
had peaked and had begun to decline and stabilize.' 99 Results of prosecutor
surveys 2°° suggested that the rates probably stabilized because prosecutors
already had ample authority to direct file all juveniles they believed were
deserving. The expanded transfer revisions of 1994 potentially made at least
13,000 more cases per year eligible for criminal court prosecution. 20 1
Despite their potential to have a large impact, the reforms had little. Thus,
the 1994 reforms, which included direct-file authority over fourteen- and
fifteen year-olds, mandatory direct file of offenders who had not benefited
from multiple prior residential placements, and a presumptive waiver
requirement for repeat violent offenders, are less easily understood in
instrumental terms. The same reform package that expanded transfer also
severed juvenile justice from a larger social welfare agency and directed the
new Department of Juvenile Justice to pursue punishment and accountability
rather than treatment and rehabilitation. 2 2 The "going rate" or the most

195. See Frazier et al., supra note 51, at 168.
196. See id. at 178; The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (visited Mar. 26, 1999)
<http://www.djj.state.fl.us>.
197. See Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does It
Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (1996); Lanza-Kaduce et al., supra note 4, at
277; Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Re-examining
Recidivism Over the Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 548, 548-49 (1997).
198. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
199. See Frazier et al., supra note 51, at 171.
200. See id. at 178-79.
201. See Frazier et al., supra note 51, at 170.
202. The contrast between Florida and New Mexico is instructive. In New Mexico, the
juvenile justice stakeholders sacrificed a few serious offenders to transfer for expressive
purposes in order to preserve the traditional juvenile justice treatment ideal and protect their
claim to resources for maintaining services for the many. See Mays & Gregware, supra note
8, at 180. In Florida, it appears that juvenile justice stakeholders sacrificed their official
commitment to the rehabilitative ideal for all juvenile offenders but maintained a separate
system for them. In so doing, Florida juvenile justice stakeholders probably enhanced their
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appropriate sanction for juveniles in need of punishment could now be
satisfied in either the criminal or juvenile justice systems." 3 Because of
the 1994 remaking of the juvenile justice system, the expanded direct-file and
mandatory-waiver authority might have been an unnecessary addition to the
transfer arsenal. The juvenile justice system had adapted itself to serve some
of the same expressive functions of criminal justice.
Our socio-historical analysis of the long-term and multifaceted legal
changes in Florida's transfer laws demonstrates the importance of Bohannan's
insight: law's efforts to institutionalize and reinstitutionalize practices and
norms also create new problems of adjustment that will stimulate additional
lawmaking. Law, at once, can be instrumental, expressive, and adaptive to
what Bohannan called "problems of phase." Individual legal reforms can
also reflect purposes and produce impacts that are wildly divergent from
those originally envisioned. Therefore, Florida's transfer history may be very
instructive to policymakers in states just beginning transfer reforms.

new organization's claim to resources and their own occupational security.
203. See SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME AND DRUGS 40 (4th ed.
1998).
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